Attacks on cryptographic systems are limited by the available computational resources. A theoretical understanding of these resource limitations is needed to evaluate the security of cryptographic primitives and procedures. This study uses an Attacker versus Environment game formalism based on computability logic to quantify Shannon's work function and evaluate resource use in cryptanalysis. A simple cost function is defined which allows to quantify a wide range of theoretical and real computational resources. With this approach the use of custom hardware, e.g., FPGA boards, in cryptanalysis can be analyzed. Applied to real cryptanalytic problems, it raises, for instance, the expectation that the computer time needed to break some simple 90 bit strong cryptographic primitives might theoretically be less than two years.
Introduction
There have been many examples where the ongoing increase in computer speed and capacities have made previously secure cryptographic systems vulnerable to brute force attacks. This perpetual weakening of cryptographic systems due to the progress in computer hardware has been incorporated in rules of application. For instance, NIST in the USA publishes elaborate rules about the phasing out of shorter (weaker) keys and algorithms over time [30, 1] . However, those rules seem not to be based on a theoretical understanding of the availability of computational resources, but more on a historical trend in technical progress (e.g., Moore's law [35] ).
It is still difficult to reliably estimate the computational efforts needed to compromise a cryptographic system, i.e., Shannon's cryptanalysis work function [31] . Many studies and applications go for ultimate security by aiming for 2 k operations, with k ≥ 128, to put brute force attacks out of reach for the foreseeable future. Others use general purpose, off-the-shelf, computers as benchmarks. Both approaches have limitations. Long keys imply costly hardware and long computations and often do not describe real life use, e.g., cost optimization for time-limited secrets. On the other hand, general purpose office and home computers are not necessarily very efficient for breaking codes and will almost certainly underestimate contemporary hardware capabilities [39] .
The error to think that an off-the-shelf general purpose CPU for an office computer is an efficient device to recover cryptographic keys and passwords or break cryptographic codes, is a common one. Expressions like Calculating X took Y hours on a Z-level computer are very often encountered. As a result, there seems to be general surprise every time it is shown that low-cost, specialized processors can outperform general office CPUs. For example, even though the idea might not have been new [4] , there was again alarm in the media when in 2007 a Russian software company, Elcomsoft, filed for a US patent for a technique to use low cost standard graphics cards to recover passwords [12] .
Although the problem mentioned above is more generally seen in complexity and game theoretical analysis, it's practical importance is most acute for cryptanalysis and digital security. Many security policies rely on cryptographic systems as a crucial element. The difficulty with studying vulnerabilities in cryptography is their theoretical status. The most interesting vulnerabilities in cryptographic systems are generally untested and the cost of a theoretically possible attack is therefore very difficult to estimate. Even though there is a good mathematical understanding of how cryptographic systems can be compromised, there is no consensus about a formalism in which the resources needed can be formally described and quantified.
This study uses a general formalism for quantifying computational resources which was proposed in [39] . This formalism defines resource use both on a symbolic level and on real hardware. The relevant parts of the model will be repeated here to make the current study self contained. The model will then be tailored to quantifying the cryptanalysis work function of Shannon [31] which aligns very closely to problems in game theory, e.g., the computational Nash equilibrium [10, 11] , and algorithmic complexity theory with space and time bounded automata [5] .
Section 2 presents a summary of the model from [39] adapted to cryptanalysis. The use of the model will be illustrated on existing hardware products. In section 3, the model is applied to some examples from the cryptanalysis literature. The results are discussed in section 4.
Cryptanalytic attacks as games
Cryptanalytic attacks are interactive procedures where a cryptographic system is attacked using computational resources to compromise protected information. It is assumed that the attacker can only use algorithmic procedures and computers. Such an attack can be emulated as a game by a collection of Turing Complete devices [31, 40] . For their mathematical convenience, Universal Turing Machines (UTM) will be used to illustrate the formalism [36] , but the results hold for all such devices. Cryptanalytical attacks are problems of computability. This model of cryptanalytic attacks fits the theoretic framework of computability logic [13, 14, 15, 16] .
In computability logic, computability is defined in terms of games. The "computer", or Attacker, plays against the Environment and "wins" if it can complete the requested computation successfully. Computability logic tries to be a complete logic of interactive computing. This study only refers to some general aspects of computability logic. The reader can consult Japaridze [15, 16] and the references therein for extensive descriptions of the theory.
In short, the Attacker can play a game against the Environment on one or more "boards", in parallel. This study will restrict itself to a Hard Play model of deterministic static games [15] . That is, only purely algorithmic and reproducible games are considered where the speed of the moves is not relevant. The environment can execute any number of moves for any single computational step of the System. In practice, these two conditions, a Hard Play model and static games, do not restrict the Attacker. They just prescribe that any attack strategy should involve a number of algorithmic steps and that the Environment, which includes the complete universe, has unlimited capacities for executing counter strategies. This model can be extended to include probabilistic strategies. In this framework, it is rather straightforward to set up a model for a cryptanalytic attack (c.f., [40, 31] ).
The Attacker model
In the framework of computability logic, the Attacker is a collection of UTMs, each with three tapes: a work tape, a valuation tape, and a run tape. The valuation tape is supposed to contain the game specific parameters supplied by the Environment, whereas the work tape will be initialized with a program to load and play games from the valuation tape. A more general interpretation of the valuation tape is that it contains any public information outside the control of the Attacker (for a more extensive description see [39] ).
The run tape contains the moves of the Attacker and the Environment. In the current framework, both the Attacker and the Environment write their moves onto the run tape. The alphabet used on the run tape is prescribed by the Environment. The Attacker can only move the reading head forward on the run tape and visit each cell only once. The Environment is free to read the run tape in any direction as often as it wants, but can only write to empty cells. To allow the "access once" restriction, all moves are written as self delimited or fixed length strings onto the run tape.
Scanning the run tape for moves of the Environment is a computational cost that must be born by the Attacker. To minimize that cost, the moments at which the Environment can write to a run tape are restricted. The Environment will only write to a run tape in response to a move of the Attacker. After the Attacker has written a move to the run tape, it can enter a "wait" state and go to sleep. Only then will the Environment write it's move or moves in a single self delimited or fixed length string to tape and wake up the Attacker who then can read the moves and continue. This interpretation of the run-tape embodies the principle that the Attacker must actively query for information from the Environment.
The Attacker can recruit as many UTMs as it wants by specifying them on the run tape from any of the existing UTMs. The communication between the Attacker UTMs is here modeled by simply letting the work tapes overlap. Other solutions are possible. Any newly instantiated UTM of the Attacker gets it's own run tape and a copy of the valuation tape.
Any request for a new UTM should consist of a full description of the finite state machine, initial state, contents of the work tape, position of the heads, and the overlap between work tapes. A new UTM is instantiated with the finite state machine specified, the valuation and work tapes loaded and the work tape is stitched up with the correct part of the requesting UTM's work tape. Then the UTM is put in the initial state with the heads over the correct tape positions and started.
The possible moves of the Attacker can be divided into 4 classes:
• General information requests
• Structural requests
• Encryption requests
• Challenges
The meaning of the first is obvious. The second kind are requests to the Environment for new daughter UTMs or changes in the current UTM, e.g., releasing work tape memory. In modeling a realistic attack, structural requests would (de-)commission computing resources. Encryption requests implement the gathering of plaintexts and ciphertexts.
The cost of defeating a cryptographic system includes actually compromising it. Challenges are Attacker initiated moves to prove it has won, i.e., succeeded in compromising the cryptographic system by actually executing and completing the attack. A challenge could be to supply the current password, but could also demonstrate the ability to correctly pair cipher-and plaintexts. Note that after every move of the Attacker, the Environment must make a move, even if it is just a denial of the request.
This model of an Attacker is able to describe a large number of cryptanalytic attacks. For instance, distributed attacks, both coordinated or not, known ciphertext or plaintext attacks, and chosen plaintext attacks. Even attacks of "security by obscurity" systems could be studied by supplying a stochastic model of information leakage to the valuation tape.
Resource needs and cost of computation
One problem with the above computational attack model is that most cryptographic systems can be defeated by simple brute force attacks, e.g., just trying all possible keys [31] or even simply trying all programs to crack the encryption (c.f., algorithmic complexity [20] ). However, the security of cryptography lies in the fact that performing computations has costs, and for a brute force attack, these costs should be too high to be feasible [31] . But to use these costs in a computational model, they should be made explicit. In the remainder of this text, the model from [39] will be used to quantify computational costs. The relevant points will be described here.
A useful cost function for computations should follow some sanity conditions. The definition should be applicable to both theoretical and real devices. The costs should be cumulative and additive under appropriate conditions. The universal nature of computational devices should be mirrored in the existence of efficient emulation of one device on another one. Here an "efficient emulator" will be defined as any device that can emulate any computation on the target device with a cost that is a linear function of the original cost and number of steps in the computation ( [39] ).
Starting with a purely theoretical device, a very simple cost function for a single UTM that agrees with all of the above conditions is
Where C is the total cost of the computation which runs over Λ steps.
is the information in bits stored in the UTM at step λ. I UT M includes details about the internal structure of the device, e.g., action tables of a UTM. See [39] for a discussion and proofs. The definition of equation 1 can easily be extended to other computational devices (even neural wet-ware [39] ). The only requirement is that the functionality of the device can be modeled as a collection of interconnected and modular 
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17 a Specifications as published in marketing materials and [44, 45, 3] . b The total number of stream processors, texture units, and render output units [3] . c The Virtex-5 FPGA is organized in slices, with each slice containing four 6-input Look-Up- Tables (LUT) and four flip-flops [27, 46] logical components, e.g., logical gates, finite state machines, or UTMs. The factor I UT M in equation 1 will be replaced by a factor I Dev which measures the number of bits needed to identify the chosen device out of all the possible devices (including all non-functional ones) that could have been constructed using the same basic components, plus the current state of these components. For instance, the logical functions a modern CPU silicon chip can perform are limited by the number of transistors it contains. The size of I CP U would therefore be related to the number of ways the transistors on it can be wired and how many states they can be in. Note that in this description, no mention is made of the actual physics of the components. That is, if the same range of logic functions could be performed using fluid valves or photonic switches, the same I Dev could result.
Relations with real hardware
The above theory on efficient emulators can be used to derive an estimate of the computational capabilities of real hardware [39] . As mentioned before, a CPU chip is characterized by a number of active elements, transistors, and the connections between them. The whole CPU is run at a certain speed. The computational cost of running a certain computation on a CPU can therefore be quantified as the number of steps needed to complete the computation times the information frozen into the chip design.
This exercise can also be done the other way around. First, the requirements for performing a basic computation in terms of electronic circuits (i.e.,transistors) and number of steps are determined. Then, the number of copies of the basic devices that fit on a silicon chip are determined. After that, the number and speed of the computations can be estimated, assuming state-of-the-art special purpose hardware could be used. It will not come as a surprise to arrive at the conclusion that custom build electronics can often outperform general purpose CPUs.
Using the cost function of equation 1 and the device information content, I Dev , can simplify this hardware analysis in many cases. It might obviate a detailed analysis of the required circuitry and replace it with a less precise but much more transparent calculation of comparable "complexity".
To make this analysis, a model is needed of the computational resources current hardware can deliver. A realistic model should take details of the limitations of chip design into account. In first approximation it is assumed that the maximal resources delivered by a CPU are proportional to the number of transistors. For the current study, a very crude model is assumed [39] . For any given number of transistors on a chip, it is assumed that each transistor can be in one of two states (1 bit) and topological constraints limit the number of different ways it can be connected to neighboring transistors to ∼100 (7 bit). In total, each transistor can thus be described with 1 byte. Table 1 gives these numbers for a few example processors. This naive hardware model is illustrated below on some simplified cryptanalysis problems. The focus of the remainder of this section will be on computebound problems. The contribution of the memory components to the computations will be ignored in the analysis.
Example: The EFF DES cracker
In [39] , the example of the EFF cracking the 56-bit single DES system in 1998 [24, 6 ] is discussed. The challenge was to find the key that could decrypt an unknown encrypted message. From this example it is possible to get an estimate of the number of transistors, and costs, needed to implement basic cryptographic functions. The EFF succeeded in designing a search unit in silicon that could check a 56 bit DES key in 16 clock cycles [24, 6] . The EFF were able to fit 24 such search units onto a single chip containing around 10,000 transistors and use the units in parallel.
So a 56-bit DES encryption unit plus comparator needed ∼ 420 transistors and runs in 16 clock cycles. With an estimated I Dev ∼ 8 · #Transistors bit, this comes down to around 6,700 bytes in equation 1 for checking a single 56-bit DES encryption+compare (i.e., 8 · 16 · 10 4 /24 bits, c.f., [39] ). This translates to ∼120 byte per bit key length if it is assumed that encryption effort scales linearly with key length.
For a brute force key attack, the average number of keys that have to be tested scales with 2 k−1 for key length k. For this specific DES attack, the computational costs, C DES (k), needed to find a key of length k then scale as:
This cost will rise for Triple-DES. Probably in the order of tripling of the cost, e.g., 360 instead of 120 byte per bit key length.
GPU chips and super-computers
A modern Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) chip, like the ATI HD Radeon 5870, contains around 2.15 billion transistors and runs at a clock speed of 850 MHz [3] . Such a processor handles computations at a cost of ∼ 18 · 10 17 bytes per second (table 1) . If such a processor could be constructed to run as an efficient parallel DES key search engine, i.e.,like the EFF custom chips, it would be able to find a 56 bit DES key in 133 seconds on average.
To illustrate the capabilities of GPUs, the analysis is extended to a hypothetical encryption method with the same features as the single DES encryption standard, DES * . This DES * system is a model of simple cryptographic primitives and encryptions. The fictional DES * differs from real DES in that it allows variable key lengths. For every key length, an EFF DES cracker setup can be constructed for this fictional DES * that scales like equation 2 and uses 120 byte per bit key length to check a single key.
On a customized processor of this size and speed, finding a 64 bit DES * key would require, on average, around 11 hours, and a 72 bit DES * key less than 5 months. A dedicated 65k (2 16 ) processor cluster would find an 84 bit DES * key in around 10 days and a 92 bit key in around 8 years. A 96 bit DES * key would take such a cluster around 120 years (on average; 240 years worst case). For finding a 96 bit DES * key in less than two years average, the technology would have to speed up by a factor of 60. At the historical rate of progress of I Dev , around 2.6 dB/year (≈ 1.82/year [39] ), this would take another 7 year to achieve (but see [35] ).
For comparison, the fifth highest entry in the November 2009 TOP 500 list of supercomputers, the Tianhe-1 supercomputer at the National SuperComputer Center in Tianjin/NUDT, China, contains 4096 Intel Xeon E5540 processors (2.5GHz, 7.3 · 10 8 transistors) and 1024 E5450 processors (3GHz, 8.2 · 10 8 transistors) connected to 5120 ATI Radeon HD 4870 GPUs (650MHz, 9.6 · 10 8 transistors) with a grand total of over 98TB of memory [32, 33, 37] . Together the processors deliver 1.3 · 10 22 bytes/sec (ignoring memory). If such a machine would have been build as a dedicated DES * key searcher, it would be able to find an 84 bit DES * key in 87 days, on average. The Tianhe-1 was build for close to 88 million USD [37] .
If the cost of encryption of Triple DES is indeed only ∼3 times that of single DES, the above numbers are not comforting. Triple DES with 2 independent 56 bit keys (keying option 2) has a listed key strength much less than the expected 112 bits [25, 38] . NIST designates this keying option to have only 80 bits of security [30] and retires it in 2010. A message encoded with the equivalent of an 80 bit DES key could theoretically be decrypted within a few days with a special purpose 65k processor cluster as described above. However, the known attacks, e.g., [38, 25] , are more complex than mere Triple DES encryption, with important time versus memory trade-off relations. Therefore, a separate analysis would be needed to calculate the costs of breaking double-key Triple DES.
A better fit with FPGA
The preceding sections assumed that an attacker could design and produce large numbers of special purpose CPU chips with state of the art semi-conductor technology to compromise cryptographic systems. In many situations, such a threat model is unrealistic. In such cases, a better model would assume that the attacker would use existing customizable products. A popular product in this class is a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), an integrated circuit designed to be configured by the customer or designer after manufacturing [43] .
Large differences in performance between general purpose processors and specially programmed (FPGA) chips have been demonstrated in the context of public key block ciphers by Gligoroski et al. [8] . They compared software implementations on a dual core Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with implementations on Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA chips (table 1) .
On an Intel Core Duo dual processor, encrypting a 160 bit block with their MQQ 1 algorithm takes 80,105 cycles and decrypting takes 6,212 cycles (tables 7 and 8 in [8] ). Assuming the CPU is running at 2.6GHz, this translates to a throughput of, respectively, 5.19Mb and 67.0Mb per second. Encryption of a basic data block (64 bit) with 1024-bit RSA requires 119,800 cycles, decrypting 2,952,752 cycles on the CPU. Throughputs for RSA are then, respectively, 1.39Mb and 56.4Kb per second.
The same MQQ algorithm had a corresponding throughput for encryption of 44Gb per second when implemented on four 276.7MHz Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs and 399Mb per second for decrypting when implemented on a single 249.4 MHz Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. An implementation of 1024-bit RSA on a 251MHz Virtex-5 FPGA had a throughput of 40Kb per second (unspecified for encryption or decryption). The computational resources consumed when encrypting or decrypting a single bit are compared in table 2.
For comparison, results for AES-128 on 16 byte blocks were collected. On an Intel Core Duo E6700 CPU, the throughput was 1Gbps [26] . Two different implementations on Virtex-5 boards achieved 4.1Gbps throughput [2] (unspecified Virtex-5 types, assumed to be the same as for the RSA, updating the results, 3.8Gbs, reported in [8] ).
Efficient use of hardware is determined by the fit between algorithm and the logic implemented in the chips. Encrypting with MQQ is amenable to parallelization and fits very well on the Virtex-5 [7] . From table 2 it can be seen that encryption with MQQ will use ∼5300 times more resources (cycles·transistors, i.e., bytes) when computed on a general purpose CPU than on a dedicated FPGA. An increase in hardware efficiency by a factor of ∼5300 would translate in an additional 12 bits key length that could be decrypted for the same "costs". On the other hand, decryption shows only a modest increase in efficiency by a factor of ∼16.
Another algorithm, 1024-bit RSA, can hardly be parallelized and shows no real efficiency difference between CPU and FPGA. The AES-128 results are in between, with a five time increase in efficiency between FPGA and general purpose CPU (assuming single core use).
The differences between the cases in table 2 raises the question of how the efficiency gains can be understood. The large gains for the encryption using the MQQ algorithm implemented on the Virtex-5 FPGA were derived from the ability to implement the steps of the algorithm in a pipeline that could output one encrypted data block per clock cycle [7] . Obviously, a tailored parallel pipeline approach is not possible with the fixed logic of a general purpose CPU. As illustrated by table 2, such dramatic increases using FPGAs might be uncommon.
Adversaries on a budget
A really Universal UTM can crack any cryptographic system that is based on secret information that is less complex than the message. This can be done by iterating over all programs and select the one that decrypts the message first. In a secret key based system, it can be done by a brute force attack iterating over all keys. However, brute force strategies can take more time and matter than are available in the universe (c.f., [21, 22, 23] ). Therefore, a meaningful way is needed to limit the power of the Attacker without losing the theoretical power of the UTM. The Attacker needs resources to perform the required computations. Resources are understood in the sense of [16, 39] . The resources are supplied by the environment on a request basis.
With a cost function to quantify computational needs in place, meaningful limits can be placed on the Attacker. A budget is allocated to the Attacker, and before every step in the computation, the resource costs of that computation step are subtracted from the budget. If the budget becomes depleted, the Attacker loses. The size of the smallest budget for which the Attacker can win the challenges before the budget is depleted can be considered the strength of the cryptographic system under study. It is obvious that a fully universal UTM is regained in the limit of an infinite budget.
An intuitively meaningful way to set a budget is to calculate the computa- tional cost of testing all possible keys. So if testing one key costs C key , testing all keys of length k bits will cost C key · 2 k , as expected. To assist in book keeping, the Attacker can request the current size of it's budget on the run tape. The valuation tape contains the information about the resources available from the environment. For instance, in situations where the Attacker does not have to design a computer system from scratch, the valuation tape might contain a catalogue of available computer systems.
To illustrate the use of the above theory, a few cryptanalytical cases from the literature are presented. Attention will be focussed on non-interactive cryptanalysis. A full account should also address the interactive gathering of information, e.g., differential cryptanalysis.
Challenges: One-Time Pad example
Modeling cryptanalytical attacks as games enforces an explicit definition of the conditions under which the Attacker wins. The computability logic model described here defines winnability as the ability of the Attacker to succeed at a number of predefined challenges. These challenges can be interactive.
For instance, in most cryptographic systems, the ability to guess whether a known message has been communicated would be a serious vulnerability. In the formalism presented here, such knowledge could be formalized as being able to guess above chance which ciphertext encodes a given plaintext.
As an example, suppose the challenge is to exploit a vulnerability in a OneTime Pad (OTP) implementation where each plaintext is XORed (eXclusive OR) with a unique sequence of random bits. The Attacker presents two self delimited plaintexts on the run tape. The environment answers with a self delimited ciphertext that encrypts one of these plaintexts. The environment can pad the shortest plaintext to the length of the longest before encryption. The Attacker then tells which ciphertext was encrypted. If the Attacker can guess the correct plaintext above chance, the Attacker wins. The threshold of proof can be put at any convenient level.
The attack strategy would then be to request encryptions of known or chosen plaintexts. The One-Time pad bit strings are available for analysis after removing (XOR-ing) the known plaintexts from the ciphertext. If some statistical deviation from a pure, uncorrelated, uniform distribution can be detected in the bit strings, the challenges can in principle be won. Simply chose the ciphertext that XORed with the plaintext shows the anomaly.
As the OTP is proven secure [31] , the challenges are only winnable if the (long) keys are not completely random, e.g., when using an insecure Random Number Generator (RNG). An Attacker model might include a simulation of compromising a RNG as in, e.g., [9, 17] . By varying the challenges between ciphertext only, plaintext chosen by Environment, and plaintext chosen by Attacker the effects of different security policies can be evaluated. For instance, the costs and benefits of preventing guessing plaintexts can be compared to those of periodically reseeding the key generator and redistributing new keys [17] .
Occasionally, the security of the OTP against cryptanalysis is questioned, as in [41, 42] . The formalism presented here can help to evaluate whether and how a vulnerability, if any, can be exploited. For instance, from the analysis presented in [41, 42] it is not clear how a chosen plaintext challenge as presented here can be won, i.e., whether there is a vulnerability at all.
Dictionary attacks and time versus memory trade-offs
There exist methods to efficiently pre-calculate dictionaries with stored ciphertext/key pairs to amortize the cost of encryptions over many different key attacks [19, 28] . To evaluate their threat, it is necessary to estimate the resources needed to construct and operate such a dictionary. Constructing a table of Rainbow chains or a dictionary of encryptions is equivalent to doing a brute force key search and requires the same effort [19, 28] . The new question is how much resources are needed to use the dictionary after it has been created.
For simplicity, assume a key size of k and an ordered (Ciphertext i , Key i ) dictionary with L = 2 k−ǫ encryptions of a 3k long plaintext X 0 as in [19] . The factor ǫ determines the fraction of keys in the dictionary as 2 −ǫ . With these numbers, the size of the dictionary is D = 4kL. According to [19] it takes at most 3k(k − ǫ) comparisons to find an encryption in the dictionary, but k − ǫ comparisons seems a more conservative choice. For k = 56 and ǫ = 6, the size of the dictionary is D = 4 · 56 · 2 50 ≈ 2.5 · 10 17 bits, or 3.1 · 10 16 bytes, and the expected number of comparisons per lookup becomes 50.
In the ideal case, every comparison is done in, say, two steps for a total of 100 steps per lookup. Assume that Attackers "lease" access to the dictionary for each look-up, that is, there are no "wait states" and the resource is in constant use by Attackers. The average cost of a lookup is then 3.1 · 10 18 bytes, ignoring the small costs of the comparisons themselves. The average cost of a discovered key would be around 2 · 10 20 bytes. Compared to the current scope of hardware, at 10 18 byte/s for a single desktop system [39] , this cost is unremarkable. The real point is not the "computation" or processing, but the required storage capacity of 31 petabyte (31 · 10 15 ). This is around 15% of the capacity of a large data-center like Google's Googleplex facility, or a "botnet" of a few million computers with some 10 GB each. Such a resource would require parallel access through many nodes, which would change the simple cost model above. A botnet of this size would have to contain some 3 million compromised computers with a real cost in the order of $15 a piece, in 2007 dollars, on the black market, or $45 million in total [29] . The combined value of the encoded information must outweigh the costs of this set up to make this attack worthwhile. The computational capacity of such a distributed data center or botnet, with it's delayed response times, is obviously different from an integrated desktop system. This analysis shows that using such a dictionary is, unsurprisingly, not so much a computational as a storage problem. In this case, the maintenance of such a large storage is much more a limitation than the duration of the computation.
Pseudo Random Number Generator attacks: The TF-1 generator
Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) are important cryptographic primitives that can be vulnerable to their own types of attacks [17] . PRNGs are used, for example, to generate the symmetric keys in public key communication protocols like SSL (Secure Socket Layer protocol). Their relative security, or lack thereof, is strongly determined by the resources available to the Attacker (e.g., [17] ). The Klimov-Shamir number generator TF-1 is analyzed by Tsaban [34] . In short, for a word size w, this PRNG has an internal state of size 4w. The intended "strength" is 2 2w [18, 34] , i.e., 2w bit. However, Tsaban finds that the internal state can be found in 16 · 2 1.5w elementary operations (i.e., 1.5w bit strength) after scanning 2 w output words for a 0 value [34] . Each possible internal state can, on average, be checked in 16 basic operations given a special 0 value in the output.
The 16 operations needed to check the internal state are very basic. A DES Cracker like search unit should be sufficient (see section 2.3.1). The original DES Cracker search unit used around 120 byte per bit key width. For the sake of argument, it is assumed here that a comparable setup could be constructed that analyzes the internal state again of the TF-1 number generator for 120 byte per bit in the reduced word size 1.5w. Each basic operation should again need only a single clock cycle. For such a system, the above analysis for the single DES cracker would still hold up to a fixed factor (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).
An efficient setup with the complexity and speed of a ATI HD Radeon 5870 (see section 2.3.2 and table 1) would need under half a second to find the internal state for a word width of w = 32 bit (48 bit strength) and less than five months for a word width of w = 48 bit (72 bit strength), both on average (see table 3). A cluster using 65 thousand such set-ups could finish a w = 56 bit word length in ten days (84 bit strength). A theoretical w = 60 bit word length variant (90 bit strength) could be expected to be broken in less than two years. For word lengths of w = 64 (96 bit strength), the time still runs into 120 years and remains elusive as Tsaban already notes [34] .
The number of output words needed to find a 0 word can become unwieldy for the longer, w = {48, 56}, word lengths (see table 3 ). For w = 48, around 2 48−1 ≈ 10 14 output words have to be scanned for a 0 value. That is around 40 hours at a billion (10 9 ) words per second (average). For w = 56 this would be a waiting time of 14 months. Note that originally, the intended strengths of word lengths of 32, 48, and 56 bit in TF-1 were, respectively, 64, 96, and 112 bit.
An efficient attack of the TF-1 number generator would be to set up a cheap system to scan for 0-words storing a history of PRNG output and relevant data to compromise. Only after a 0-word has been encountered, the machinery to attack the cypher would be commissioned and the attack performed.
No one has yet reported a DES Cracker like set-up for TF-1. So the above calculations are based on the assumption that it could be possible to harness the design complexity of a modern GPU for custom designed cryptanalysis hard-ware.
The above analysis allows to put a monetary number on the price to crack this specific PRNG. Users of this algorithm can now judge themselves how much any adversaries would be willing to pay for such a set-up and what the chances are of a version of the algorithm that does not need to find a 0 word.
Discussion and conclusions
Cryptanalysis promises to be a very fertile field for developing insight into the quantification of computational resource needs. A game theoretic view of cryptanalysis was introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern and later taken up by Shannon [40, 31] . This study adopts this game approach and proposes to use computability logic [15, 16, 39] to rigorously define Shannon's work function [31] . In this approach, attack procedures are formulated in terms of computable functions [36] , the resources used, and also a full definition of the context of the attack.
Based on a few "natural" requirements, a simple formula for quantified resources emerges as equation 1 with the features of Memory times Steps, i.e., a dimension of bytes [39] . This count includes the information "frozen" into the computational device itself, e.g., the UTM action table or the components and connections of the CPU. By reducing silicon CPU complexity to transistor connectivity and memory capacity, it is possible to roughly guess the capacity of real hardware.
Using the estimated hardware complexity of mass market processors as an upper boundary, it is possible to estimate the limits of customized cryptanalytic hardware. These limits can be used to understand historical cases, like the failure of 56 bit DES encryptions [6] . These limits can also be used to predict the (theoretical) failure of modern cryptographic primitives like the TF-1 PRNG with a theoretical strength of 84 and 90 bit keys (intended strengths were originally 112 and 120 bits) [18, 34] as well as the efforts needed to actually effectuate It can be concluded that the general problem of quantifying computational resource use in interactive cryptanalysis attacks can be solved in a formalized setting. When used to formalize cryptanalysis, it becomes possible to quantify the cryptanalysis work function [31] . Even the computational costs of hypothetical attacks on cryptographic primitives can be estimated before they have to be demonstrated at great monetary cost.
Examples show that it would currently (2010) be feasible to build hardware that could break some 84 bit strength cryptographic primitives in mere days, and 90 bit strength primitives in less than two years. 
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